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Abstract. The concept of threshold ring signature in code-based cryp-
tography was introduced by Aguilar et al. in [1]. Their proposal uses
Stern’s identiﬁcation scheme as basis. In this paper we construct a novel
threshold ring signature scheme built on the q-SD identiﬁcation scheme
recently proposed by Cayrel et al. in [14]. Our proposed scheme beneﬁts
of a performance gain as a result of the reduction in the soundness error
from 2/3 for Stern’s scheme to 1/2 per round for the q-SD scheme. Our
threshold ring signature scheme uses random linear codes over the ﬁeld
Fq, secure in the random oracle model and its security relies on the hard-
ness of an error-correcting codes problem (namely the q-ary syndrome
decoding problem). In this paper we also provide implementation results
of the Aguilar et al. scheme and our proposal, this is the ﬁrst eﬃcient
implementation of this type of code-based schemes.
Keywords: post-quantum cryptography, code-based cryptography, iden-
tiﬁcation scheme, threshold ring signature scheme.
1 Introduction
The development in the ﬁeld of quantum computing is a real threat to the secu-
rity of many used public key cryptographic algorithms. Shor has demonstrated
in 1994 that cryptographic schemes whose security relies on the diﬃculty of the
factorization problem (e.g., RSA) and the diﬃculty of the discrete logarithm
problem (e.g., DSA), could be broken using quantum computers. Consequently,
it is necessary to have available alternative signature and identiﬁcation schemes.
Coding based cryptography is one of the few alternatives supposed to be se-
cure in a post quantum world. The most popular cryptosystems based on error-
correcting codes are the McEliece [22] and Niederreiter [24] ones. The main
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advantage of these two public key cryptosystems is the provision of a fast en-
cryption and decryption procedure (about 50 times faster for encryption and
100 times faster for decryption than RSA).
Secure identiﬁcation schemes were introduced by Feige, Fiat and Shamir [18].
These cryptographic schemes allow a prover to identify itself in polynomial time
to a veriﬁer without revealing any information of its secret key. Stern proposed
at Crypto’93 [27] the ﬁrst zero-knowledge identiﬁcation scheme based on the
syndrome decoding problem, this scheme could be turned into a digital signature
via the Fiat-Shamir paradigm [17].
The concept of ring signatures was introduced ﬁrst in 2001 by Rivest et al.
[26]. Ring signatures permit any user from a set of intended signers to sign a
message with no existing group manager and to convince the veriﬁer that the
author of the signature belongs to this set without revealing any information
about its identity.
In 2002, Bresson et al. [12] extended ring signature schemes in a t-out-of-N
threshold ring signature schemes, which enable any t participating users belong-
ing to a set of N users to produce a signature in such a way that the veriﬁer
cannot determine the identity of the actual signers.
The concept of threshold ring signatures in code-based cryptography was in-
troduced by Aguilar et al. in [1,2]. Their proposal is a generalization of Stern’s
identiﬁcation scheme. The major advantage of this construction is that its com-
plexity depends linearly on a maximum number of signers N , comparing with the
complexity of threshold ring signature schemes based on number theory whose
complexity is O(tN). However, the disadvantage of large public key size and
signature length is still unsolved for this scheme.
Our Contribution: In this paper we propose an improved code-based threshold
ring signature scheme. We achieve this by extending the ﬁve-pass zero-knowledge
(q-SD) identiﬁcation scheme proposed in [14] to a threshold ring identiﬁcation
scheme and applying the same idea as the Fiat-Shamir paradigm to transform
it to a threshold ring signature. In this paper we provide also a ﬁrst eﬃcient
implementation of the Aguilar et al. scheme and our scheme in order to show
the advantage of our proposal in terms of performance.
Organization of the Paper: This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we
recall some background on code-based cryptography. In Section 3 we present the
q-SD identiﬁcation scheme recently introduced by Cayrel et al. in [14], followed
by some suggested improvements. We show in Section 4 how to use the q-SD
identiﬁcation scheme to construct our proposal, then we discuss the security
and gives in detail the performance aspect of our construction by providing
implementation results. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall useful notions of code-based cryptography. We refer to
[9], for a general introduction to these issues.
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2.1 Definitions
Linear codes are k-dimensional subspaces of an n-dimensional vector space over
a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq, where k and n are positive integers with k < n, and q a prime
power. The error-correcting capability of such a code is the maximum number ω
of errors that the code is able to decode. In short, linear codes with these param-
eters are denoted (n, k)-codes or (n, n − r)-codes, where r is the co-dimension of
a code with r = n − k.
Definition 1 (Hamming weight). The (Hamming) weight of a vector x is
the number of non-zero entries. We use wt(x) to represent the Hamming weight
of x.
Definition 2 (Generator and Parity Check Matrix). Let C be a linear
code over Fq. A generator matrix G of C is a matrix whose rows form a basis
of C :
C = {xG : x ∈ Fn−rq }
A parity check matrix H of C is defined by
C = {x ∈ Fnq : HxT = 0}
and generates the dual space of C .
Let n and r be two integers such that n ≥ r, Binary(n, r) (resp. q-ary(n, r)) be
the set of binary (resp. q-ary) matrices with n columns and r rows of rank r.
Moreover, denote by x $←− A the random choice of x among the elements of a set
A.
We describe in the following the main hard problems on which the security
of code-based schemes presented in this paper relies.
Definition 3 (Binary Syndrome Decoding (SD) problem).
Input : H $←− Binary(n, r), y $←− Fr2, and an integer ω > 0.
Find : a word s ∈ Fn2 such that wt(s) ≤ ω and HsT = y.
This problem was proven to be NP-complete in 1978 [8]. It can be extended to
arbitrary ﬁnite ﬁelds as follows.
Definition 4 (q-ary Syndrome Decoding (qSD) problem).
Input : H $←− q-ary(n, r), y $←− Frq, and an integer ω > 0.
Find : a word s ∈ Fnq such that wt(s) ≤ ω and HsT = y.
In 1994, A. Barg proved that this last problem remains NP-complete [5, in
russian].
Definition 5 (q-ary Minimum Distance (qMD) problem).
Input : H $←− q-ary(n, r), and an integer ω > 0.
Find : a word s ∈ Fnq such that wt(s) ≤ ω and HsT = 0.
Notice that the diﬃculties of solving the two problems (qSD and qMD) are
equivalent [28]. The intractable assumptions associated to these problems are
denoted by qSD assumption and qMD assumption, respectively.
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Best known attack. The most eﬃcient algorithm to attack code-based schemes
is the Information Set Decoding (ISD) algorithm. Some improvements of this
algorithm have been developed by Peters [25], Niebuhr et al. [23], and Bernstein
et al. [10], and recently in [21] by Becker et al. and [7] by May et al.. The recent
results of this attack are taken into account when choosing our parameters.
3 The q-SD Identification Scheme
An identiﬁcation scheme is an interactive method for one party to prove to an-
other that a statement is true, without revealing any additional information. In
this section, we present the recent q-SD identiﬁcation scheme based on error-
correcting codes proposed by Cayrel et al. in [14]. The soundness error of ap-
proximately 1/2 allows a performance gains when compared to Stern’s scheme.
For instance, one needs 16 rounds for the q-SD identiﬁcation scheme and 28
rounds for the Stern’s one to achieve the weak authentication probabilities of
2−16 according the norm ISO/IEC-9798-5.
3.1 Description of the q-SD Identification Scheme
In what follows, the elements of Fnq are written as n blocks of size log2(q) = m
and each element of Fq is presented as m bits.
We ﬁrst introduce a special transformation that will be used later.
Definition 6. Let Σ be a permutation of {1, . . . , n} and γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) ∈ Fnq
such that ∀i, γi 	= 0. The transformation Πγ,Σ is defined as follows:
Πγ,Σ : Fnq −→ Fnq
v → (γΣ(1)vΣ(1), . . . , γΣ(n)vΣ(n))
Notice that ∀α ∈ Fq, ∀v ∈ Fnq , Πγ,Σ(αv) = αΠγ,Σ(v), and wt(Πγ,Σ(v)) = wt(v).
The q-SD identiﬁcation scheme is comprised of two algorithms: key generation
and identiﬁcation protocol. Given the security parameter κ, the key generation
algorithm described in Fig. 1 picks a random (r ×n) q-ary matrix H common to
all users, a random vector s (secret key) with Hamming weight ω. It outputs the
public key y by multiplication of the vector s by a matrix H . The identiﬁcation
protocol described in Fig. 2 corresponds to a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
that the prover P possesses a private key s with a given public key y.
In Fig. 1, WFISD denotes the Work-Factor of ISD algorithm over Fq and in
Fig. 2, h denotes a hash function, Sn the symmetric group of degree n and || the
concatenation of two strings.
The authors of [14] proved that the protocol presented in Fig. 2 corresponds
to a zero-knowledge interactive proof in the random oracle model, that means it
satisﬁes the completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge properties.
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Key-Gen:
Choose n, r, ω, and q such that WFISD(n, r, ω, q) ≥ 2κ
H
$←− Fr×nq
s
$←− Fnq , s.t. wt(s) = ω.
y ← HsT
Output (sk,pk) = (s, (y,H,ω))
Fig. 1. Key generation algorithm: parameters n, r, ω, q are public
Prover P(s, (y, H,ω)) Verifier V(y,H, ω)
u
$←− Fnq , Σ $←− Sn
γ
$←− Fn∗q
c1 ← h
(
Σ||γ||HuT
)
c2 ← h (Πγ,Σ(u)||Πγ,Σ(s)) c1, c2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
α←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− α $←− Fq
β ←− Πγ,Σ(u + αs) β−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− b $←− {0, 1}
If b = 0: Σ, γ−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c1 ?= h(Σ||γ||HΠ−1γ,Σ(β)T − αy)
Else:
Πγ,Σ(s)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c2 ?= h(β − αΠγ,Σ(s)||Πγ,Σ(s)),
wt(Πγ,Σ(s)) ?= ω
Fig. 2. The q-SD identiﬁcation protocol
Some Improvements of the q-SD Scheme:
– To get better communication complexity in comparison to the original ver-
sion of the protocol presented in Fig. 2, the prover could use a public function
ϕ−1q by sending ϕ−1q (Πγ,Σ(s)) instead of Πγ,Σ(s), where ϕq is an eﬃcient
bijective encoding which takes its input from the interval [0, (q−1)ω(nω
)
[ and
outputs a binary word of length n and Hamming weight ω. This function is
described in Algorithm 2 (see Appendix).
– We could use the same random seed to generate the permutation Σ and the
vector γ in order to reduce more the communication complexity.
Proposed parameters. According to the ISD algorithm, the suggested parameters
for the q-SD scheme are: q = 256, n = 128, r = 64, ω = wt(s) = 49.
Table 1 shows the advantage regarding the communication cost and the size
of the public key of the q-SD scheme in comparison with Stern’s initial proposal
and his ﬁve-pass variant, for the same security level of 280 and an impersonation
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Table 1. Stern’s schemes vs. the q-SD scheme, security level 280, probability of cheating
2−16
Stern (3-pass) Stern (5-pass) q-SD
Rounds 28 16 16
Public data (bits) 122850 124950 33280
Secret key (bits) 700 4900 1024
Communication complexity (bits) 42019 62272 39056
Prover’s Computation 222.7op. over F2 221.92op. over F2 216mult + 216add op. over F256
resistance of 2−16. It is considered that all seeds used are 128 bits long and that
all hash values are 160 bits long.
Remark 1. To be fair, the two improvements above-mentioned according the
scheme q-SD are not taken into account in the calculation of the communica-
tion complexity in table 1, since these improvements can be applied to Stern’s
schemes. However by using the same seed for Σ and γ, the communication com-
plexity will be 30864 bits, and only 26760 bits if we use in addition an encoding
function.
Remark 2. We want to mention that the authors in [3] propose a new ﬁve-
pass identiﬁcation scheme with small size of keys and an asymptotic cheating
probability of 1/2, this scheme is related to the Véron identiﬁcation scheme
and its security is based on the syndrome decoding Problem. The idea of this
construction is based on deriving new challenges from the secret key through
cyclic shifts of the initial public key syndrome.
3.2 Signature Schemes from Identification Schemes
One eﬃcient method to derive a signature from an identiﬁcation scheme is given
via the Fiat-Shamir paradigm [17]. Pointcheval and Stern use the well-known
forking lemma, in order to provide the security argument of signatures ob-
tained from three-pass identiﬁcation protocols. The authors in [4] extend the
Fiat-Shamir transform and the Forking lemma to obtain secure signatures from
identiﬁcation protocols with multi-pass. For instance, in the case of a ﬁve-pass
identiﬁcation scheme, the signer replaces the two moves given from the veriﬁer
by the outputs of some random oracles, he sets the transcript (σ1||h1||σ2||h2||σ3)
as a signature of a message M , where h1 and h2 the outputs of two hash func-
tions H1 respectively H2 modeled as random oracles, and the σ1, σ2 and σ3 the
values given from the prover as in the identiﬁcation scheme. Similarly to [20],
the authors of [4] generalize the forking lemma even more for ring signatures
schemes in order to give security arguments for such a class of signature.
4 Code-Based Threshold Ring Signature Schemes
The notion of threshold ring signature is introduced in 2002 by Bresson et al. [12].
We ﬁrst deﬁne the formal deﬁnition of the threshold ring identiﬁcation scheme
which can be turned to get a threshold ring signature in accord with Section 3.2.
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Definition 7. Let t < N be integers. We assume that each user Pi owns the pair
of keys (ski, pki) corresponding respectively to the secret and the public keys.
Let P1, . . . , PN be the N potential provers of the ring with their public keys
pk1, . . . , pkN . Let t of the N members form a group of provers, one of them is
the leader L. The threshold identification scheme consists of the algorithms:
– Setup takes a secret parameter as input and outputs the public parameters
and chooses the leader.
– Ring key generation takes public parameters as input and outputs a pair
of keys corresponding to the secret and the public key.
– Commitment-challenge-answer and verification step is an interac-
tive protocol between the t-users and the verifier consisting of the computa-
tion of the commitments, challenges and responses, following by a verifica-
tion step which takes as input the answers of the challenges and verifies the
honestly of the computation, and returns 1 (accept), and 0 (reject).
For the security of a threshold ring signature scheme the basic criteria are:
– Unforgeablity: Without the knowledge of the t secret keys, it is infeasible to
generate a valid (t,N) threshold ring signature.
– Anonymity: Given a message-signature pair, it should be infeasible for the
veriﬁer to reveal which t-subset of signers generated a signature.
See deﬁntion 3 and 4 in [2] for a formal deﬁnition of the two above properties.
In [1], Aguilar et al. introduced the ﬁrst code-based threshold ring signature.
The main idea of this scheme is to generalize the Stern’s identiﬁcation scheme
and then convert this latter into a threshold ring signature using the Fiat-Shamir
paradigm. Aguilar et al.’s scheme is proven to be a zero-knowledge protocol with
soundness error of 2/3 as in the Stern’s protocol for each round. Its security
relies on the hardness of the binary Minimum Distance problem.
A second code-based threshold ring signature scheme has been proposed by
Dallot and Vergnaud in [16]. Their proposal is not derived from an identiﬁcation
scheme. It uses Goppa codes and combines the generic construction of Bresson
et al. [12] and the CFS signature scheme [15]. The authors of [16] obtained a
short signature but the required time to generate it, is too high, and the huge
public key size is also a disadvantage of their proposal.
Using the Aguilar et al.’s approach, Cayrel et al. proposed in [13] a lattice-
based threshold ring signature scheme based on the hardness of the SIS problem.
The soundness error of approximately 1/2 for the q-SD identiﬁcation scheme
allows a performance gains when compared to Stern’s scheme. In order to make
use of this gain, we present in this section a novel threshold ring identiﬁcation
scheme and according to Section 3.2, we turn it into a threshold ring signature
scheme.
To describe our scheme, we need the two notions of block permutations:
Definition 8. Let n and N be two integers and let β =
(β1, . . . , βn, βn+1, . . . , β2n, . . . , βnN ) be a vector of length nN defined over
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some alphabet. Let us define for i ∈ [1, N ] the elements β˜i = (β(i−1)n+1, . . . , βin)
such that β can be expressed as (β˜1, . . . , β˜N ).
The constant (n,N)-block permutation Θ is a permutation over {1, . . . , N}
which acts over vectors of length nN such that
Θ(β) = Θ(β˜1, . . . , β˜N ) = (β˜Θ(1), . . . , β˜Θ(N))
Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σN ) be a family of N permutations over {1, . . . , n}, we define a
(n,N)-block permutation Π, as a permutation which acts over a vector of length
nN and which is the product of a constant n-block permutation Θ and the family
σ, i.e.
Π(β) = Θ(σ1(β˜1), . . . , σN (β˜N ))
Informally speaking a constant (n,N)-block permutation divides a vector of
length nN into N blocks of size n and permutes them. A (n,N)-block permuta-
tion permutes also for each block the components of the block.
Example 1. The permutation (6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) is (2, 3)-block permutation, and the
permutation
(3, 4, 5, 6, 1, 2) is a constant (2, 3)-block permutation since the order on each
block ((1, 2), (3, 4) and (5, 6)) is preserved in the block permutation.
4.1 Description of Our Threshold Identification Protocol
We consider one set of N members. Let (P1, . . . , Pt) be a subset of this set
consisting of the members who want to prove that they know some secret s,
whereas one of them is a leader L. The parameter t corresponding to the number
of provers has to be ﬁxed at the beginning of the protocol.
Our protocol consists of the following steps: Setup, Ring public key generation,
Commitment-Challenge-Answer and Veriﬁcation step. We can formally describe
each step as follows:
– Setup Given κ as security parameter, we generate the corresponding public
parameters n, r, ω, and q such that WFISD(n, r, ω, q) ≥ 2κ, where n and r
are the parameters for each matrix Hi (1 ≤ i ≤ N) which will be used to
form the ring public matrix. Each matrix can be constructed as follows: we
choose a random vector si ∈ Fnq of weight ω, generate n − r − 1 random vec-
tors and consider the code Ci obtained by these n − r words (the operation
can be repeated until the co-dimension of Ci is r). The matrix Hi is then a
parity-check matrix of a code Ci and thus we have HisTi = 0, where si ∈ Fnq
has a weight ω. The fact that we take a same syndrome and the same weight
for the vectors si helps for conserving the anonymity in the group. For the
(N − t) other users, si are ﬁxed at 0, because 0 is always a solution of the
equation HisTi = 0.
– Ring key generation The leader collects all these matrices and forms
among them a public key (H, tω) called ring public key, the matrix H can
be described as follows:
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H =
⎛
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
H1 0 · · · 0
0 H2 0 0
... . . . Hi 0
0 0 · · · HN
⎞
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
– Commitment-challenge-answer and verification step To simplify the
description, we consider that the t provers correspond to the ﬁrst matrices Hi
(1 ≤ i ≤ t). The leader L, member of the set of t provers among N members,
want to prove to the veriﬁer that he knows a secret key s, where s is a nN
vector of weight tw. This will be achieved by performing the following steps:
- Each member of the t provers (including L) creates local commitments
using the secret keys si and sends them to L.
- L collects all these commitments, simulates the missing ones for the (N −t)
other users by ﬁxing all remaining si by 0, and create the master commit-
ment using a random constant block permutation.
- The master commitment are sent to the veriﬁer V .
- V chooses a random value α over Fq and sends it to L, the latter one
forwards this value to the (t − 1) provers.
- Each member of the t provers (including L) calculates the vectors βi, L
collects those values and creates a global vector β′ using a constant block
permutation and it will be sent to V .
- V chooses a challenge from {0, 1} and sends it to L who forwards it to the
(t − 1) provers.
- L collects the answers from the (t−1) provers, computes the responses for
the other users and ﬁnally computes a global answer for V .
- After receiving the global answer, V checks the correctness of the master
commitments.
Algorithm 1 gives a full description of this interaction between the set of t provers
and the veriﬁer. This algorithm has to be performed in multi-rounds in order to
reach the required impersonation resistance.
We stress that during the answer step (line 19 of Algorithm 1), the knowledge
of the permutation ρ permits to recover Θ, Σi, and γi for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . In addition,
the veriﬁer can easily obtain βi(1 ≤ i ≤ N) by applying the inverse of θ on the
known vector β′.
4.2 Security
We ﬁrst prove that the generalized q-SD identiﬁcation protocol is an honest-
veriﬁer zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. The resulting threshold ring signa-
ture obtained from the application of the work presented in [4] on the generalized
q-SD identiﬁcation protocol is existentially unforgeable under chosen message at-
tacks in the random oracle model.
Lemma 1. Finding a vector s of length nN such that the global weight of s is
tw, the weight of s for each of the N blocks of length n is 0 or ω, and such that
s has a null syndrome for H, is hard under the assumption of hardness of the
qMD problem.
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Algorithm 1. Generalized q-SD protocol
Input: n, k, N, t ∈ N, where k < n and t < N .
H ∈ FrN×nNq , where r = n − k and h a collision resistant hash function.
Private key: s = (s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ FnNq , wt(sj) = 0 or wt(sj) = ω with wt(s) = tω and HsT = 0.
Commitment step:
1: Each prover Pi chooses ui $← Fnq , Σi $← Sn, γi $← Fn∗q (1 ≤ i ≤ t).
2: Pi constructs c1,i ← h
(
Σi||γi||HiuTi
)
and c2,i ← h
(
Πγi,Σi (ui)||Πγi,Σi (si)
)
.
3: Pi sends c1,i and c2,i to leader L.
4: L fixes the secret keys si of the N − t other users at 0 (t + 1 ≤ i ≤ N).
5: L chooses N−t values ui $← Fnq and N−t permutations Σi $← Sn and N−t values γi $← Fn∗q (t+1 ≤
i ≤ N).
6: L chooses Θ $← SN in order to obtain the master commitments.
7: L computes the master commitments C1 ← h(Θ||c1,1|| . . . ||c1,N) and C2 ←
h(Θ(c2,1, . . . , c2,N )).
8: C1 and C2 are sent to the verifier V .
9: V sends back the value α $← Fq and L passes it to each Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ t).
10: Pi computes βi ←− Πγi,Σi (ui + αsi) (1 ≤ i ≤ t).
11: L computes βi ←− Πγi,Σi (ui) (t + 1 ≤ i ≤ N).
12: β′ = Θ(β) = Θ(β1, · · · , βN ) = (βΘ(1), . . . , βΘ(N)) is sent to V .
Challenge step:
13: V sends a challenge b $←{0, 1}
Answer step: 
 The first part of this step is between each prover Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ t) and the leader L.
14: if b = 0 then
15: Pi sends γi and Σi to L.
16: else if b = 1 then
17: Pi sends ϕ−1q (Πγi,Σi (si)) to L.
18: end if 
 ϕ−1q is an implementation detail not necessary for the algorithm.
19: L simulates the N − t other answers with si = 0 (t + 1 ≤ i ≤ N).
20: L computes the answer for V :
21: if b = 0 then
22: γ = (γ1, . . . , γN ), Σ = (Σ1, . . . ΣN ), and Θ are sent to V .
23: else if b = 1 then
24: ρ(s) = (ΠγΘ(1),ΣΘ(1) (sΘ(1)), . . . , ΠγΘ(N),ΣΘ(N) (sΘ(N))) is sent to V . 
 NB: Not Θ.
25: end if
Verification step:
26: if b = 0 then
27: V checks C1 ?= h(Θ||h(Σ1||γ1||H1Π−1γ1,Σ1 (β1)
T )|| · · · ||h(ΣN ||γN ||HN Π−1γN ,ΣN (βN )
T )) and
Θ
?∈ SN .
28: else if b = 1 then
29: V checks
C2
?= h
(
⎛
⎜
⎝
h(βΘ(1)−αΠγΘ(1) ,ΣΘ(1) (sΘ(1) ) || ΠγΘ(1),ΣΘ(1) (sΘ(1)))
h(βΘ(2)−αΠγΘ(2) ,ΣΘ(2) (sΘ(2) ) || ΠγΘ(2),ΣΘ(2) (sΘ(2)))
...
h(βΘ(N)−αΠγΘ(N),ΣΘ(N) (sΘ(N)) || ΠγΘ(N),ΣΘ(N) (sΘ(N)))
⎞
⎟
⎠
T
)
,
wt(ρ(s)) ?= tω, and that ρ(s) is formed of N blocks of length n and of weight ω or weight 0.
30: end if
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Proof. The construction of the matrix H (described above) and the vector s
implies that ﬁnding such a n-block of length nN is also equivalent to ﬁnding a
solution of a local hard problem si of weight ω such that Hisi = 0, which is hard
under our assumption.
Theorem 1. Our scheme is an honest verifier zero-knowledge proof of knowl-
edge, with soundness error bounded by 1/2, that the group of t provers knows a
vector s of length nN such that the global weight of s is tω, and such that the
vector s has a null syndrome for H. The scheme is secure in the random oracle
model under the assumption of the hardness of the qMD problem.
Proof. We prove that our scheme satisﬁes the three properties: completeness,
soundness and zero-knowledge.
Completeness: It is clear that each group of honest provers who has the knowl-
edge of a valid secret key is able to answer correctly any of the honest leader’s
queries, which permit him to compute the master commitments. The leader, on
his turn is able to reveal the information necessary to the honest veriﬁer, in order
to check the correctness of these commitments.
Soundness: In [14] it was proven that the regular q-SD scheme satisﬁes this
property and that the soundness error is bounded by 1/2, assuming that the
qMD problem is hard. Because our protocol can be seen as a composition of t
simultaneous executions of the q-SD scheme and given that the latter one can be
reduced to our protocol by making all signing instances equal, this implies that
this soundness error cannot be higher than 1/2 for our protocol in one single
round.
Zero-knowledge: The zero-knowledge property for our protocol can be proven
in the random oracle model. In order to do that, we use the classical idea of
resettable simulation. Let M be a polynomial-time probabilistic turing machine
(simulator) using a dishonest veriﬁer. Because of the two interactions with the
leader (prover for our case), we have to assume that the dishonest veriﬁer could
contrive two strategies: St1(C1, C2) taking as input the leader’s (master) com-
mitments and generating a value α ∈ Fq, St2(C1, C2, β′) taking as input the
leader’s commitments, the answer β and generating as output a challenge in the
set {0, 1}. M will generate a communication tape representing the interaction
between leader and veriﬁer. The goal is to produce a communication tape whose
distribution is indistinguishable from a real tape by an honest interaction. The
simulator M is constructed as follows:
Step 1. M randomly picks a query b from {0, 1}.
– If b = 0, M randomly chooses: ui, γi, Σi (1 ≤ i ≤ N) and Θ as a random con-
stant block permutation on N blocks {1, 2, . . . , N}, and solves the equation:
Hs′T = y for some vector s′ = (s′1, . . . , s′N ) of length nN and not neces-
sarily satisfying the condition wt(s′) = tω. The values c1,i (1 ≤ i ≤ N) can
be computed as follows: c1,i = h
(
Σi||γi||HiuTi
)
, the master commitments
are taken then as C1 = h(Θ||c1,1|| . . . ||c1,N ) and C2 as a random string.
By simulating the veriﬁer, M applies St1(C1, C2) to get α ∈ Fq, and then
computes β′ as follows: β′ = Θ(Πγ1,Σ1(u1 +αs′1), . . . , ΠγN ,ΣN (uN +αs′N )),
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and has the information needed to derive the simulated communication data
between leader and veriﬁer. Therefore the candidates to be written in the
communication tape consist of elements A = C1||C2, β′ and ans= ρ =
Θ(Πγ1,Σ1 , . . . , ΠγN ,ΣN ). Taking into account the uniform distribution of the
random variables used in the computation of A, ans and β′, it follows that
the distribution of these elements is indistinguishable from those resulting
from a fair interaction.
– If b = 1, M randomly chooses ui, γi, Σi (1 ≤ i ≤ N) and Θ as a random
constant block permutation on N blocks {1, 2, . . . , N}. This time it picks s =
(s1, . . . , sN ) as a random vector from the set FnNq with weight tω and formed
of N blocks of length n and of weight ω or 0. The commitments C1 will be
given uniformly at random values and C2 = h(Θ(c2,1, . . . , c2,N )) such that
each c2,i = h(Πγi,Σi(ui)||Πγi,Σi(si)). Again, from St1(C1, C2), M gets α ∈
Fq and computes β′ as follows: β′ = Θ(Πγ1,Σ1(u1 + αs1), . . . , ΠγN ,ΣN (uN +
αsN )), and has the information needed to derive the simulated communi-
cation data. The communication set features elements A = C1||C2, β′ and
ans = ρ(s) = (ΠγΘ(1) ,ΣΘ(1)(sΘ(1)), . . . , ΠγΘ(N),ΣΘ(N)(sΘ(N))). The uniformly
random character of the choices made will render these elements indistin-
guishable from those resulting from a fair interaction.
Step 2. M applies the veriﬁer’s strategy obtaining b′ as result.
Step 3. When b = b′, the machine M writes on its communication tape the
values of A, α, β′, b and ans. If the values diﬀer, however, nothing is written
and the machine returns to Step 1.
Therefore, in 2δ rounds on average, M produces a communication tape indis-
tinguishable from one that corresponds to a fair interaction process execution
that takes δ rounds. unionsq
We derive the following corollary due to the results from [4].
Corollary 1. The resulting threshold ring signature scheme obtained from the
honest verifier zero-knowledge q-SD identification protocol is unforgeable under
chosen message attacks in the random oracle model.
Theorem 2. Our threshold ring signature scheme obtained from the q-SD iden-
tification protocol is anonymous in the random oracle model.
Proof. The second property we would like to examine is the anonymity property
in the random oracle model of the resulting threshold ring signature scheme ob-
tained from our q-SD identiﬁcation protocol. In other words, the veriﬁer must
not be able to determine the identity of the real signers, a part from the fact
that they were at least t among the n speciﬁed ring members. For the challenge
0 the response of both real signers and the non-signers are completely indistin-
guishable, since Θ, Σi, and γi are chosen uniformly at random and therefore the
response is random. So the only possibility to identify non-signers is challenge
1. In this case the veriﬁer receives a permuted value of the secret key without
having access to the used permutation. As consequence, the anonymity of the
signers is preserved. unionsq
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Table 2. Comparison code-based threshold ring signature schemes
Threshold ring Signatures Pk size in KBytes Sign. size in KBytes Sign. cost in bops
Aguilar et. al’s scheme 1470 2448 230
Dallot and Vergnaud’s scheme 10137122 7 235
Our scheme 400 2384 226
4.3 Performance and Implementation
Theoretical Results. In general the signature length of signature schemes
derived from identiﬁcation schemes is constrained by the number of rounds.
Our proposal is built by applying the q-SD identiﬁcation scheme, which needs
a smaller number of rounds to reach the same probability of cheating as Stern’s
identiﬁcation scheme. For a probability of cheating of 2−80, one needs about 140
rounds for Stern’s identiﬁcation scheme and only 80 rounds for our proposal.
This fact has a positive eﬀect in terms of signature length for our proposal as
we will see below.
Dallot and Vergnaud’s scheme uses a CFS signature scheme as basis, there-
fore it inherits the advantage to provide a shorter signature length, however it
suﬀers from slow signature generation cost and large key sizes compared to our
construction.
In Table 2 we give our results in terms of key sizes, signature length and
the signing cost for the parameter set (N, t) = (100, 50) in comparison with the
code-based threshold ring signature schemes due to Aguilar et al. [1] and Dallot
and Vergnaud [16].
Before we do that we have to mention that the signature length of our scheme
is N times the signature length of one q-SD signature length, similarly is for the
computation of the public key size and the complexity of the protocol.
For our scheme, taking into account the performances of the ISD algorithm,
we suggest the following parameters: q = 256, n = 128, r = 64, and ω = 49.
For the same security level, we need to take respectively: q = 2, n = 694, r =
347, ω = 69 for Aguilar et al.’s scheme [1] and, q = 2, n = 222, r = 198, ω = 9
for Dallot and Vergnaud’s scheme [16].
We considered that all seeds used are 128 bits long, the hash outputs are
160 bits long, the security level is 280, and that the probability of cheating is
bounded by 2−80.
Table 2 shows that for the same level of security, the public key size for our
scheme is almost four times smaller than Aguilar et. al’s one and 25344 times
smaller than Dallot and Vergnaud’s one. The signature length of our construction
is 2384 Kbytes, where that of Aguilar et al.’s scheme is 2448 Kbytes and almost 7
Kbytes for Dallot and Vergnaud’s one. For signing cost, we obtain better results.
Using the two improvement presented in Section 3, the signature length of
our threshold ring signature scheme is almost 1633 KBytes.
We also compare our scheme to the recent work [13], which is a lattice based
threshold ring signature based on the hardness of SIS problem and is related to
this work.
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For a 111 bit-security, the authors of [13] obtain 45 Mbytes for the signature
length. Using our scheme the signature length is only 4 Mbytes for the same
security level and the same hash length (224 bits), using parameters q = 256, n =
204, r = 102, and ω = 71.
Remark 3. To reduce more the public key size, we can use the proposal in [19]
and [6] by replacing a random matrix H by a double circulant matrix respectively
a quasi-dyadic matrix. In this case, we obtain a public key size in 12.5 Kbytes
for our construction, 8.47 Kbytes for Aguilar et al.’s one. and 1146 Kbytes for
Dallot and Vergnaud’s scheme.
4.4 Practical Results
General Remarks. The following tables show the timings we have obtained
for a C implementation. The test system was an Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU
E8400@3.00GHz, running Debian 6.0.3. The sources have been compiled using
gcc 4.6.2.
In all cases, we used parity check matrices in systematic form. Due to the
row-major order of C, the transposed matrices have been stored. The number of
the ring members was always set to 100, the number of ring provers to 50. The
tables show the setup time and the time running the protocol, where the setup
time is consumed for the generation of the necessary public and private keys.
Finally, the use of quasi-dyadic matrices does not allow for all theoretically
possible parameters. For instance, dyadic matrices have the dimension 2p × 2p
(p ∈ N), which means that for quasi-dyadic matrices r = d2p for some d ∈ N. In
order to have comparable results and a uniform implementation, we have used
this restriction for the random and the quasi-cyclic case as well.
Aguilar et. al Scheme. The number of rounds for the scheme has been set to
28 (probability of cheating 2−16), the dimension of the parity check matrix HT
over F2 has been set to 704×352, but only the redundancy part has been stored
in memory, which is of dimension 352 × 352. The weight of the secrets been set
to 76 (Table 3).
Our Scheme. For our scheme the parity check matrices HT have been chosen
over F28 , mainly because in this case a ﬁeld element ﬁts exactly in one byte. The
Table 3. Aguilar et al. timings for 28 protocol rounds, H ∈ F352 ×7042
Matrix Type Dim. [n × r] Weight Setup [ms] Protocol [ms] Total [ms] Sec
Random 704 × 352 76 108.539 98.662 207.200 280
Quasi-dyadic 704 × 352 76 811.202 474.737 1285.939 280
Quasi-cyclic 704 × 352 76 476.796 302.935 779.731 280
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Table 4. Timings for our scheme and 16 protocol rounds, H ∈ F72 ×14428
Matrix Type Dim. [n × r] Weight Setup [ms] Protocol [ms] Total [ms] Sec
Random 144 × 72 54 32.979 18.499 51.477 280
Quasi-dyadic 144 × 72 54 44.331 29.109 73.439 280
Quasi-cyclic 144 × 72 54 38.747 26.550 65.298 280
number of rounds has been set to 16 (probability of cheating 2−16), the weight
of the secrets has been set to 54. The number of the ring members was again set
to 100 and the number of ring provers to 50 (Table 4).
Remark 4. As one can see, the computational cost for quasi-dyadic/-cyclic cases
is always higher than using random parity check matrices. The reason is that
the vector-matrix product is more expensive in those cases, because the matrix
has to be reconstructed on the ﬂy during the multiplication without actually
building the whole matrix in memory. The savings in memory have to be paid
for with additional runtime.
Remark 5. The given implementation is given as a proof of concept. For instance,
the communication between the leader and the provers takes place on the same
machine, even inside the same executable. In reality, the provers would be lo-
cated on diﬀerent computers, having a diﬀerent architecture, connected to the
leader via network connections and the like. In such a heterogeneous scenario,
the communication latency for those network connections had to be taken into
account. It also might be possible that some provers use a very fast machine,
whereas others use a very slow one. The interaction process would be dominated
then by the slowest possible prover.
Transforming into a Signature Scheme. Similar to the general technique
shown by Fiat-Shamir, we can transform our scheme into a signature scheme.
The idea is that the signing and verifying part are handled separately, i.e. at
ﬁrst, the leader simulates the challenge step of the veriﬁer using a public stream
cipher or public hash function with some predeﬁned starting value involving the
document to sign. The protocol is then run without further veriﬁcation, but all
the data which are needed for veriﬁcation, in particular the master commitments,
has to be recorded. These data form the signature.
The veriﬁer uses the recorded data to run the protocol without the signing
side. For the challenge step, the veriﬁer uses the same starting value for the
stream cipher or hash function as the signing part did. The document is part
of this starting value. A consequence of this approach is that the signatures
become quite large as everything needed for veriﬁcation has to be recorded in
the signature.
In Table 5 we give some timings for the resulting signature scheme. We used
the same settings as above, but run the protocol with random matrices only. The
savings using other matrix types is negligible compared to the gained signature
sizes.
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Table 5. Timings for 80 protocol rounds, H ∈ F72 ×14428
Doc. [MiB] Sig. [MiB] Dim. [n × r] Weight Signing [ms] Verification [ms] Total [ms] Sec
1 4 144 × 72 54 544 454 998 280
10 13 144 × 72 54 3643 3551 7194 280
25 28 144 × 72 54 8803 8700 17503 280
The signature sizes are not ﬁxed, but show a small variation depending on the
values chosen during the challenge step. More speciﬁcally, the answers transmit-
ted for the cases b=0,1,2 vary in size, which eﬀectively leads to varying signature
sizes as well. The values are therefore average values obtained while running the
protocol 80 rounds (probability of cheating 2−80).
5 Conclusion
Starting from the recently proposed q-SD zero-knowledge identiﬁcation scheme
[14], we presented in this work a novel threshold ring signature scheme based on
error-correcting codes based on the q-SD identiﬁcation scheme. Since the q-SD
scheme has a low soundness error allowing a speciﬁed security to be reached in
few rounds, our construction uses this fact to achieve a scheme which shorter
signature length, smaller public key size and signature cost compared to Aguilar
et al.’s which is based on Stern’s identiﬁcation scheme. We have conﬁrmed our
results by implementing the both schemes in C that shows clearly the advantage
of our proposal. The source code of our implementation can be found here:
http://www.cayrel.net/IMG/tgz/waiﬁ-ﬁles.tgz.
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A Encoding Function over Fq
The constant weight encoding bijective function ϕq is described in Algorithm 2,
this function takes its input from the interval [0, (q−1)ω(nω
)
[ and outputs a q-ary
word of length n and Hamming weight ω. Algorithm 2 uses a binary encoder
method introduced by Biswas and Sendrier [11]. This function is a constant
weight encoding function taking s = ω log2(n/ω) input bits and outputing a
binary word of length n and weight ω, and which is very eﬃcient because of its
linear time encoding.
Algorithm 2. q-ary EnumDecoding
Input: integers n, q, ω and x ∈ [0, (q − 1)ω
(
n
ω
)
[, (ω ≤ n)
Output: q-ary word of length n and Hamming weight ω
1: db ← x/(q − 1)ω
2: ret ← binary encoder(db, n, ω)
3: rest ← x mod (q − 1)ω
4: for i from 1 to n do
5: if 0 < ret[i]
6: ret[i] ← (rest mod (q − 1)) + 1
7: rest ← rest/(q − 1)
8: end if
9: end for
10: Return ret
